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In "Exceptional Persons," Tamar Gendler argues 
that we cannot make reliable judgments about imaginary 
cases because the conceptually necessary and sufficient 
conditions for application of the concept of personal 
identity (sameness of person) don’t guide our application in 
everyday cases, and while acceptable in actual cases, this 
leads to error in considering hypothetical cases.  In this 
paper, I explain Gendler's argument against the utility of 
thought experiments on personal identity and argue that 
the central case she uses to illustrate the problem is 
mishandled.  
Gendler argues that even if our concept of 
personal identity is structured around a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, they do not "play a role in how it 
is that we identify candidates as falling under that concept" 
(Gendler 1998, 594).  Ordinarily judgments about personal 
identity are based psychological and bodily continuity 
indifferently.   However, Gendler holds, our indifference is 
not due bodily and psychological continuity each being 
conceptually sufficient, but rather to their being 
contingently reliably correlated.  In thought experiments, 
often either psychological or bodily continuity is absent, 
and, relying uncritically on ordinary practice, she says, we 
make judgments based on the remaining cue.  Gendler 
argues that our intuitions about imaginary cases can 
therefore mislead us by being based on insufficient 
evidence or on whatever usual cues are present.   
If Gendler is right about judgments in hypothetical 
cases, there ought to be cases that trigger different cues 
and produce inconsistent results.  Gendler's argument 
depends on showing that we make inconsistent identity 
judgments in two nominally different cases that are 
essentially the same.  I argue that in her central example, 
the two descriptions are not of the same case and that one 
of them is of something conceptually impossible. In 
addition, I argue that even if her example were successful, 
we could easily avoid making the kind of mistake it would 
illustrate.  
To show that thought experiments are unreliable, 
Gendler appeals to a thought experiment discussed by 
Bernard Williams in "The Self and the Future" (Williams 
1975).  She argues that the two cases involved in Williams' 
thought experiment (described below), though described 
slightly differently, are fundamentally the same, though our 
intuitions about personal identity differ in accordance with 
the description. 
I call the two cases the 'mind-continuous' and 
'body-continuous' cases.  Williams and Gendler argue that 
our intuitions yield different criteria for personal identity in 
the two cases.  However, since the cases are supposed to 
be different descriptions of the same situation, our 
intuitions, if they are tracking the conceptually necessary 
and sufficient conditions for personal identity, should give 
us the same answer.   
In both Williams' cases, we are to imagine the 
following situation: Two persons, person AA, the person 
associated with psychological-states-A, body/brain-A and 
person BB, the person associated with psychological-
states-B, body/brain-B, are told at t0 about an operation 
they will undergo at t1 the result of which is that at t2 brain-
B is associated with the psychological states previously 
associated with AA, and brain-A is associated with the 
psychological states previously associated with BB.  Two 
persons emerge—AB and BA.   
In the 'mind-continuous' case we are also asked to 
imagine that at t0, before AA undergoes the procedure, she 
is told that either AB or BA will be given a large sum of 
money and the other will be tortured.  AA is then asked to 
make a self-interested decision as to whether the reward 
should be given to AB or BA at t2.  Plausibly at t0 AA would 
choose that at t2 AB receive the reward since AB will have 
the psychological states previously associated with AA, the 
individual making the choice.  Here it seems that AA 
makes her choice based on psychological continuity and 
does not concern herself with body-A.   
In the 'body-continuous' case, we are asked to 
imagine that AA is told by the surgeon at t0 that she will be 
tortured after the procedure, at t2, but that during the 
torture she will have no memory of being told so.  
Furthermore, she will not have any memories of her past; 
rather, she will have a new set of impressions of her past.  
Williams argues that the person associated with 
psychological-states-A, body/brain-A at t0 will be disturbed 
and concerned that both her body and mind will be 
harmed.  That BA at t2 has no memory of having been told 
the outcome of the procedure beforehand and knows at t1 
that body-A will be associated with different brain-states at 
t2 seems not to affect the way she reacts.  Williams argues 
that it is clear that at t0 AA is, and should be, concerned 
about what is going to happen to herself at t2, which shows 
that she identifies herself with her body.  
Gendler argues that what's going on is that the 
same situation is being described in different ways.  One 
description makes psychological continuity salient.  One 
makes bodily continuity salient.  We respond to the salient 
continuity indifferently, as we do in ordinary life.  But both 
reactions can’t be right.  So one or the other response 
must be wrong, she argues, and this shows that in at least 
one case we rely on a feature contingently correlated with 
a conceptual sufficient condition, but which is not one.  
And this shows that thought experiments are generally 
unreliable, or so the argument goes. 
Clearly, Gendler's argument requires the two 
descriptions to be of the same situation.  If the cases 




described are genuinely different, then it does not follow 
that one of the judgments is wrong.  If the situations 
described are distinct circumstances, we can get different 
answers to the question of who is who because the 
application conditions for the concept can be sensitive to 
the differences between the two cases, thus removing the 
immediate threat to the utility of thought experiments.   
Three conditions must hold for Williams' cases to 
do the work that Gendler wants them to do: 
(i) our intuitions produce discrepant judgments in response 
to the different descriptions, 
(ii) our discrepant intuitions are not easily dislodged, and 
(iii) the descriptions she offers are of the same situation.  
Gendler needs all three conditions since her 
argument against the utility of thought experiments 
depends on claiming that we get conflicting intuitions about 
the same situation described differently.  This is evidence 
for the claim that we do not make judgments about 
personal identity in hypothetical cases always on the basis 
of application conditions.   
Williams' thought experiment is supposed to reveal 
that our intuitions can be swayed by various descriptions of 
the same situation, and so we cannot rely on them to 
reveal the necessary and sufficient application conditions 
for personal identity. If the two descriptions are of one and 
the same situation, yet, contrary to Gendler, our intuitions 
do not conflict with one another in the first place, then 
Gendler has not given us any reason to think we are 
mislead by the thought experiment in the way she 
describes.  Alternatively, if the two descriptions are of one 
and the same situation, then if at first we have conflicting 
intuitions, but upon reflection decide that Gendler may be 
mistaken, then we have grounds to argue that the danger 
of being mislead is not serious enough to undermine the 
use of thought experiments in personal identity.  Or, if the 
thought experiment does not contain two descriptions of 
the same situation, but descriptions of two genuinely 
different cases, then her claim is groundless.  In what 
follows, I argue that we have reason to question whether 
any of these conditions hold.  
First, assuming that the descriptions are of the 
same case, it is not clear that our intuitions conflict as 
Gendler suggests.  In the body-continuous case, if AA 
were told at t0 that tomorrow she would have none of her 
memories, she may be disturbed, but perhaps not because 
BA will not have any memories of AA's past or of being 
told the situation, but because at t2 AA will no longer exist!  
That is, where the surgeon implies AA will undergo the 
torture that BA will be subjected to, even if AA buys into it 
at first, it seems that upon reflection, she will realize that 
she will not be subject to torture—she will be dead.  So, 
although AA will be disturbed by the situation, she will be 
disturbed for different reasons than Williams (and Gendler) 
suggest.  The description of the 'body-continuous' case 
expresses something conceptually impossible.  We are 
gulled by an illegitimate appeal to authority.  
Second, suppose, as Gendler argues, that from 
the two descriptions of the case we make different identity 
claims that are not immediately reconcilable—in the 'mind-
continuous' case we make a judgment based on 
psychological continuity and in the 'body-continuous' case 
based on bodily continuity.  Once it is made clear that we 
have made this mistake in judgment the question we 
should ask is, "can we safeguard ourselves from making 
this kind of mistake?"   
If by being cautious and reflective we can 
safeguard ourselves, then Gendler's observation gives us 
no general reason not to appeal to thought experiments.  
So, the fact (if it is a fact) that the conceptually necessary 
and sufficient application conditions for personal identity do 
not guide our application of it will not suffice as an 
argument against thought experiments.  Furthermore, we 
should want a strong argument to support such a claim, 
since it has profound implications in philosophy 
independently of the consideration of thought experiments.  
Finally, consider whether these two descriptions 
are of one and the same case.  It seems that the first case 
is described so that it is not obvious who is identical with 
whom.  Presumably when one makes a self-interested 
decision about who is to undergo torture at t2, one implicitly 
makes an identity judgment—when AA decides that AB 
should receive the reward and BA should receive the 
torture, we can infer (that AA thinks) that AA=AB since one 
would not choose torture for oneself.  The second case, 
however, is described so that it is unnecessary for us to 
appeal to our intuitions.  We cannot infer an identity 
judgment from what the surgeon says about the torture 
since it is clear from the description who is to be identical 
with whom.  We are told that the surgeon tells AA at t0 that 
she will undergo torture at t2, but that she will not have any 
memories of being told so.  The surgeon in the case 
presupposes that she (AA) will be identical with the person 
who will undergo torture at t2 (BA), thus dictating that 
personal identity in this case is preserved by bodily 
continuity.  By accepting (on authority) the description of 
the case as one that is conceptually possible, we have 
committed ourselves to bodily continuity being sufficient for 
personal identity, but not on the basis of an intuitive 
reaction.  So, where the 'mind-continuous' description is 
neutral and invokes our intuitions, the 'body-continuous' 
description smuggles in the "intuition". 
Additionally, if Gendler argues that we get 
inconsistent intuitions about who is identical with whom in 
the cases described, it must be that one of the intuitions is 
right and the other wrong.  Prima facie Gendler does not 
have to say which one is correct for her argument to 
succeed.  However, her argument only works if bodily 
continuity is sufficient for personal identity.  In what follows, 
I show that presupposing that criterion for personal identity 
is disastrous for her argument. 
Gendler is committed to bodily continuity being 
sufficient for personal identity by supposing that the 'mind-
continuous' and 'body-continuous' cases are the same 
case, for the judgment is smuggled into the 'body-
continuous' case.  Gendler accepts the description is 
coherent.  So, Gendler accepts bodily continuity suffices 
for personal identity.  Since she needs one of our 
judgments to be wrong for there to be a problem, she 
cannot hold one of the hybrid views about personal 
identity, i.e., one where both bodily and psychological 
continuity are sufficient.  
To see Gendler's commitment to bodily continuity, 
suppose psychological continuity is sufficient for personal 
identity and bodily continuity is not.  Then our intuitions are 
correct in the 'mind-continuous' case.  But the 'body-
continuous' case could not then be a true description of 
any possible circumstance, because a personal identity 
claim is built into that description.  That description could 
only be correct if bodily continuity were sufficient.  Thus, if 
psychological continuity is sufficient and bodily continuity 
not, the two descriptions cannot be of the same possible 
circumstance; the example would not serve Gendler's 
purposes.   
On the other hand, suppose bodily continuity is 
sufficient for personal identity and psychological continuity 
is not.  Then, our intuitions in the 'mind-continuous' case 




are wrong.  So, if bodily continuity is sufficient and 
psychological continuity not, then these two descriptions 
might conceivably be of one and the same case, because 
our psychology-favoring intuitions could just be wrong. 
This is disastrous for Gendler because her 
argument against the use of thought experiments relies on 
a commitment to a sufficient condition for personal identity, 
which is what is in question.  Furthermore, anyone who 
wants to buy this argument must agree that bodily 
continuity is sufficient for personal identity because that is 
the only way the descriptions can be of the same case.  
However, it is not clear why we should agree or even how 
Gendler knows that bodily continuity is sufficient for 
personal identity.  Endorsing bodily continuity as a 
sufficient condition is not a position Gendler should want to 
be in.  Not only has Gendler presupposed a criterion that 
she was supposed to be searching for, she presupposed a 
controversial, perhaps even counterintuitive, answer to the 
question about the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
personal identity!  The conclusion to be drawn is not that 
we should not appeal to thought experiments, but that they 
should be described in a way that doesn't beg the question 
if we want useful results.  But of course!   
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